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ABSTRACT 
The European Union considers the establishment of a stable 
democratic system as a precondition for the EU membership. Political culture 
of a country is regarded as one of the most important determinants of the 
consolidation of a democratic political regime in that country.  This paper 
looks at the question of how compatible are the political cultures of the 
Western Balkan countries with democratic values and in turn with the EU’s 
Copenhagen political criteria. The hypothesis that a a democratic political 
system requires a democratic political culture has been tested. The individual 
survey data from the World Values Survey have been analyzed in the paper. 
Western Balkan political cultures are found to be compatible with democracy 
in some respects and not to be compatible in some others. However, some 
countries which seem to have the least demoratic political culture such as 
Macedonia achieved more progress on democratization compared to other 
countries which had more democratic political cultures that that of 
Macedonia.    
 
Introduction 
Western Balkan countries strive for the European Union membership. 
In the process of the EU membership, they have to meet the Copehnagen 
political criteria in order to become a full member of the Union. However, the 
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countries of Western Balkans are said to have a different political culture 
from the other East European countries. Some observers even argued that  
these countries show the charateristics of Asian countries and cultures 
different and less democratic than the cultures of European countries. One 
implication of a such an argument is that these countries are culturally 
distinct and inherently undemocratic therefore cannot establish stable 
democracies required by the Copenhagen political criteria. For example 
Bebler argues that  since this region has been very unstable throughout 
history, it is very different from the northern half of former Eastern Europe. 
Rather, western Balkans is ‘similar in its make-up to the geopolitical fault line 
stretching from Eastern Turkey all the way to China. Not incidentally, Z. 
Brzezinski called this fault line the “Asian Balkans” (Bebler, 2008, 7).’  Further 
he asserts that the countries of this region has serious political and security 
problems including  the existence of intolerance, pathological nationalism 
and and xenophobia;- underdeveloped democratic political culture, the 
lacking art of compromise’ (Bebler, 2008, 8). Arguably, ‘the Western Balkans 
represent the most difficult set of prospective accession countries so far 
encountered by the EU’ (Pridham, 2008). The EU Commission recognizes 
these difficulties. According to a EU commission communication to the 
European Parliament and the Council:  ‘Basic issues of state building, good 
governance, administrative and judicial reform, rule of law including the fight 
against corruption and organized crime, reconciliation, socioeconomic 
development, and civil society development, are key reform priorities for the 
Western Balkans (Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council, Brussels, 5.3.2008, COM(2008) 127 final). 
This paper looks at the political cultures of the Western Balkan 
countries in the second half of the 1990s and at the begining of this century. It 
tries to determine if these countries have a democratic or undemocratic 
political culture. The paper further looks at the level of demoratization in 
these countries and seek to understand whether undemocratic political 
cultures hindered the establishment of democracy in some of the Western 
Balkan countries.  
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Preconditions for Democracy and the Importance of Political Culture 
 The transition to demoracy and the consolidation of a democratic 
system depend on a number of factors in a country. Apart from 
preconditions concerning economic -social development, and a nation’s 
wealth, the content of political culture of a country is also regarded as a 
precondition for democracy. Political culture is the system of values and 
beliefs that defines the context and the meaning of political action (Sorensen, 
1993, s. 26). Political culture could be related to larger set of values in society 
such as religious values. For example, Lipset has long been asserted that 
political culture in dominantly protestant countries is more conducive to 
democracy than political cultures of Catholic or Islamic countries (Lipset, 
1996). According to Fukuyama, culture is the most important level on which 
the establishment of democratic political system in a country must occur in 
order for it to be consolidated. He argues that cultural factors operates at the 
deepest level affecting ideological,institutional and civil societal levels. 
Although democracy could be consolidated ideologically, institutionally and 
at the level of civil society, the culture of a country can be the most resistant 
to democratic consolidation.   From this brief discussion the importance of 
political culture on the process of democratization, we can propose an 
hypothesis about the process of democratization in Western Balkan 
countries.  
Hypothesis: Those Western Balkan countries which has the least democratic 
political culture will be the least democratically developed countries in terms 
of the establishment of democratic institutions and democratic processes.  
Data and Operationalization 
The data from 1994-99 and 1999-2004 World Values Surveys will be 
used for this study. These survey were carried out national teams in every 
country sponsored by the University Michigan's World Values Survey center.   
A country has been regarded as having a more democratic political 
culture if this country scored higher on a number of survey questions 
inclduding support for democracy, political tolerance, active membership in 
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civil societial organizations. The level of democratization in these countries 
will be measured in terms of their progress on the EU's Copenhagen political 
criteria. The EU's Copenhagen political criteria requires that a candidate 
country secure the stability of institutions quaranteeing democracy, the rule 
of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. A country’s 
progress on these criteria is usually accepted as the criteria for recognizing 
this country as a candidate country and also for opening the acession 
negotiations with these countries. 
 
Political Cultures of Western Balkan Regimes and Democratization 
Existence of a Political Society 
The establishment of functioning and legitimate state structure has 
been regarded as the most important precondition for democracy. Therefore, 
the degree to which the public’s of the Western Balkan countries see the state 
they live in as legitimate is important first step in these countries' 
democratization. This is an issue about which many of the western Balkan 
countries have significant problems. Since most of these countries are 
relatively new countries established in the process of  the dissolution of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, there could be some problems in 
terms of these states' collective identity and the constitutional organization. It 
is important to understand to the degree to which these states achieved a 
collective political identity. The existence of a political society is seen as 
crucial for the establishment of a democracy in a country (Rustow, 1970). 
Therefore, almost all members of a society should view themselves as 
members of the same political body or the state for a stable democracy to 
exist.  The level of nationalism and patriotism in a society could indicate the 
degree of its members emotional attachment to the polity. The nationalism is 
seen here as a positive force uniting the members of a society not the kind of 
ethnic or micro nationalism as a force of division in society.   
Table 1. % of respondents very proud and quite proud of their nationality and % of 
respondents willing to fight for their country. 
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 Table 1 shows the percentages of respondents in each western Balkan 
country who are proud of their nationality and who are willing to fight for 
their country. These two survey questions could indicate respondents’ loyalty 
to their political societies. Albanians are the most proud of their nationality 
while Serbians are the least proud of their nationality. While the respondents’ 
attachment to political society remain stable in some countries such as 
Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia, there are considerable 
changes in time in terms of the percentage who are proud of their nationality 
in some countries such as Montenegro and the republic of Srpska. There 
occured a significant decrease in the percentage of respondents who are 
proud of their nationality in the latter countries between 1998 and 2001. It 
can be argued that political societies in these countries are fragile in respect to 
the loyalty of individuals to the state. Although they are the most proud of 
their nationality, the Albanians are the least willing to fight for their country. 
It could be concluded that the Albanian national identity is strong regardless 
of a political society. There is not necessarily a relationship between being 
proud of for one’s Albanian identity and to fight for the Albanian state.   
 
 
 
 
Support for Democracy and other Types of Regimes: 
Table 2. Support fo democracy and other type of regimes in Western Balkan Countries. 
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 Democracy can only be stable if a majority of a country’s population 
regard it as better than any other political regimes. The support for 
democracy and other type of regimes in Western Balkan countries therefore 
can be indicative of the prospects of democracy in these countries.  Richard 
Rose argued that democracy should at least be viewed a better form of regime 
compared to other alternative regime types in order for it to take root in a 
country (Rose et. al.  1998). A significant percentage of respondents in 
western Balkan countries think that democracy is a better political regime 
even though it has some problems.  Only in Macedonia and in the Republic 
of Srpska, the support for democracy is lower than 80 percent.  Even though 
the populations of Western Balkan countries overwhelmingly support for 
democracy, they do not express satisfaction with the development of 
democracy in their countries.  Macedonian and Croatian publics are the least 
satisfied in this respect.  A significant proportion of the respondents in each 
country also state that democracies are indecisive and have too much 
squabbling.  The population of the Republic of Srpska has the  largest 
percentage of the respondents viewing democracy as indecisive. Serbian, 
Macedonian and Bosnian publics follow the republic of Srpska population in 
this respect.  
In general, less then 10 percent of the populations of the Western 
Balkan countries think that having a political system ruled by the army is very 
or fairly good. Only expections are Albania, Srpska and Bosnia in the 1998 
survey and the Macedonian population in the 2001 survey, 22 percent of 
whom think that having a political system ruled by the army is very or fairly 
good. Macedonian, the republic of Srpska and Bosnian populations again 
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have the largest percentages of respondents who think that having a political 
system ruled by a strong leader is very or fairly good.  65,5 percent of the 
respondents in Macedonia favored a political system ruled by a strong leader 
in the 2002 survey.  71,1 percent support for the army rule in Albania should 
be evaluated in the light of the anarchical condition of political system in this 
country in 1997. Albania was experiencing an anarchical political and 
economic situation  as the state protected economic pyramid schemes 
collapsed in 1997.  Even army barracks and police stations were looted and 
most people acquired arms. People were extremely dissatisfied with the 
government and looked for other alternatives that could provide order and 
security.  
The most serious competitor to democratic regime in the Western 
Balkan countries is the rule by the experts.  A significant percentage of the 
respondents in each country think that having a political system ruled by the 
experts is very or fairly good.  The expert rule is the most desired in Croatia, 
Montenegro and Serbia. It could be concluded that economic problems 
associated with the transition from communist regimes to free market system 
convinced the publics of these countries that the economies of their countries 
could be better run by experts rather than indecisive and squabbling 
politicians. Still, a significant proportion of the respondents in each country 
think that even though democracy has some problems it is better than other 
political regimes. Macedonian public however is the least likely to state that 
democracy is better than its alternatives. Serbian and the Republic of Srpska 
populations follow the Macedonian public in this respect. Otherwise almost 
90 percent of the respondents in other countries think that democracy is a 
better regime than others. The Croatian and the macedonian respondents are 
the least satisfied with the development of democracy in their countries. 
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System Support: Trust in Institutions, people and the system 
Table 3. Trust in national and international institutions and people (Percentage of 
respondens who have  great deal and quite a lot turst)  
 
Postcommunist societies are described as the societies of distrust 
(Rose, 1996). The endurance of the single party rule with a strict adherence of 
an all-encompassing ideology made these societies suspicious of the ‘real 
intentions’ of the officials and other members of the society. Individiuals had 
dual identities and lives: private and public. The rise of ethnic nationalism 
was one of the consequences of this distrust but it also reinforced this culture 
of distrust in these societies.  On the other hand, strong democratic political 
system requires both horizontal (people trusting other people) and vertical 
(people trusting institutions) trust in a society.  
The most trusted institution in the Western Balkan countries is the 
army. 89 per cent of the respondents in Bosnian Federation stated that they 
have great or quite a lot confidence in the army in the 1998 survey. 77, 3 
percent of Croatian and 80,5 per cent of Republic of Srpska respondents 
expressed confidence in the army. 
Confidence in political parties is the lowest in Western Balkan 
countries. Macedonia is the leading country in this respect. Only 9,3 percent 
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of the respondents in Macedonia stated that they had confidence in political 
parties in the 2001 survey. Albanian public has the greatest confidence in 
political parties. Although Bosnian Federation and the republic of Srpska 
respondents had a significant level of trust in political parties in 1998, there 
was a sharp decline in the level of political party trust in 2001 in both of these 
political entities. Western Balkan public’s trust their parliament more than 
they trust political parties. However, the confidence in the parliament is still 
low in these countries. Macedonian respondents have the lowest level of 
confidence in the parliament, which is 14,7 percent in the 1998 survey and 6,9 
percent in the 2001 survey.  The civil service in these countries do not fare 
any better. Macedonian population again has the least confidence in the civil 
service. Only 17,7 percent of the respondents in the 1998 survey and 16,4 
percent in the 2001 survey expressed confidence in the civil service in 
Macedonia.  
 The confidence in the European Union is the highest in Albania and 
the lowest in Serbia, Croatia and Macedonia. Around 80 per cent of the 
Albanians had confidence in the EU while only about 20 per cent of Serbians, 
29,9 percent of Croatians and about 30 per cent of the Macedonians had 
confidence in the EU.  Interpersonal trust is also regarded as providing a 
favorable environment for democracy in general. In western Balkan 
countries, the level of interpersonal trust is low. In 1996, only 7,5 percent of 
the Macedonian respondents said that most people can be trusted in society. 
The level of interpersonal trust is the highest in Montenegro, which is only 
around 30 percent.  
Western Balkan publics had considerable level of confidence in the 
justice system in their countries. 73,5 percent of the Republic of Srpska 
population and 67,4 per cent of the Bosnian federation population had great 
or quiet a lot confidence in the Justice system in their countries.  The police is 
viewed in more positive terms  by these publics. 83,2 percent of the Bosian 
population, 71,9 percent of the Albanians and 69,5 percent of the republic of 
Srpska population had confidence in the police in the 1998 survey. 
Macedonian respondents had the least confidence in both the Justice system 
and the police. However, when we look at the level of political corruption 
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perceived by the public, there is a widespread belief that corruption is 
common in the public sector. Only 12,1 percent of the Macedonians stated 
that none or only a few of the public officials involved in corruption 
remaining respondents thinking that there is widespread corruption in the 
system. Only 19,9 percent of the Bosnian and Croatian publics think that the 
level of corruption in the public sector is negligible. Montenegrins are the 
most optimistic on this matter. 45 per cent of them stated that the number of 
public officials involved in corruption is not significant.  
 Western Balkan populations viewed the old communist regime in 
negative terms. 90,6 per cent of the Albanians thought that it was a bad 
political system. Montenegrins in  the 1996 survey had the most favorable 
view of the old communist regime, only 31,2 percent viewing it as bad. 
However,  the performance of the current political system also evaluated in 
negative terms in general. 87,5 percent of the Macedonians thought that the 
existing political system is a bad one. Monteregrins and the Albanians had the 
most favorable view of the existing political system. 
 
Tolerance of Different People and Groups 
Table 4. % of respondents who do not want a neighbor of a differen race or religion 
 
 
 The existence of political tolerance in a society is regarded as one of 
the favorable conditions for the establishment of stable democratic 
institutions (Seligson, 2000). When asked about their opinion about which 
group they do not want as a neighbor, the respondents in Western Balkan 
countries mentioned people from a different race and religion and those who 
are political extremists among other groups. Among these three, political 
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extremists are mentioned by the largest number of people.  30,4 percent of 
Albanians in the 2002 survey stated that they would not like a person from 
different race as their neighbour. 35,2 percent of the republic of Srpska 
population and 26,4 percent of the Macedonians said so. 46,0 percent of the 
republic of Srpska respondents did not want a person from a different 
religion as their neighbor compared to only 18, 4 percent of the Bosnian 
Federation respondents who said so. Only a handful of respondents in every 
country stated that they would allow their least liked group to demonstrate. 2, 
4 percent of the Albanian, 2,5 percent of the republic of Srpska population 
and 3,0 percent of the Macedonians would allow the least liked group to 
demonstrate. People who would allow the least liked group to teach or to hold 
office comprise  an even a lower percentage. The respondents were also asked 
about their opinion if a party leader should stand firm for what he or she 
believes, even if others disagree or he or she should be prepared to cooperate 
with other groups, even if it means compromising some important beliefs.  
The highest percentage of respondents who wanted a firm party leader came 
from the republic of Srpska, which is 41,5 per cent while only 16,5 percent of 
the Bosnian Federation respondents wanted firm party leader. The republic of 
Srpska, Albanian and the Macedonian publics seemed to be less tolerant of 
different people while the Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian populations 
seemed to be more tolerant of differences.  
 
Political Interest and Civic Engagement 
Table 5. Interest in Politics and membership in civic associations 
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While a significant part of the Western Balkan countries are interested 
in politics, they do not necessarily think that politics is important. Well above 
50 per cent of the respondents in every country stated that they follow politics 
in the news at least several times in a week. While those who think that 
politics is important comprised about 20-30 percent of the respondents.  
 The level of active membership in civil societal organization is low in 
Western Balkans. Only a small number of individuals in each of these 
countries involved in civic associations actively, which is usually less than 4 
percent. The most  important expection is the republic of Srpska, which seem 
to have the most mobilized population in terms of active membership in 
organizations. 21 percent of the country’s population is a member of political 
party compared to 6 percent in Bosnian Federation and only 2.8 percent in 
Croatia. 17,8 percent of the republic of Srpska population is an active 
member of sports or recreational organizations whereas only 4,6 percent of 
Montenegrins are actively involved in these kinds of organizations. The active 
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labor union membership is again the highest in the republic of Srpska and the 
lowest in Albania.  The exceptional involvement of the respondents from the 
republic of Srpska reminds one of the Almond and Verba’s  (1963) warning 
that too much of a participatory political culture is not conducive to 
democratic  stability. There should be a balance between the governmental 
authority and citizen involvement in a democracy. 
Conclusions 
 
The political culture of Western Balkan countries show considerable 
support for demoratic political regime. These publics think that democracy 
may have problems but it is better than other alternatives such as the rule by 
the army. The support for a political system ruled by the army or a strong 
leader is relatively low. However, western Balkan populations favor a political 
system ruled by the experts. A considerable part of these publics are not 
satisfied with the development of democracy in their countries and also think 
that democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling.  
 When we turn to people’s confidence in institutions and other people, 
we see considerable variation. While political parties and the civil service do 
not attract people’s confidence, the parliament, the Justice system and the 
police are trusted by these publics more. The level of interpersonal trust is low 
in these countries.  
 Tolerance towards people from different religion, race and political 
opinion is rather low in these countries. Very few respondents expressed 
willingness to allow the least liked group to demonstrate, not to mention to 
teach or to hold office. People’s interest in politics is rather high however they 
think that politics is not important. The active involvement in civil societal 
organizations is very low in Western Balkan countries.  
Croatia is currently a negotiating candidate country, which is expected 
to join the EU first among the current candidate countries. Macedonia is an 
official candidate state while Albania is a potential candidate state. Macedonia 
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could enter the Union after Croatia depending on Turkey’s performance.  
Freedom House ranks Croatia as a free country while Albania and Macedonia 
are ranked partly free democratizing countries.  
 
Explaining the Macedonian Exception 
Macedonia, according to the survey data used in this paper, stood out 
as having the least democratic political culture in terms of a number of 
aspects such as support for democracy, confidence in institutions and people, 
political tolerance and the level of corruption in the system. However the 
current progress of Macedonia on democratization is accepted to be better 
than other Western Balkan countries expect Croatia. We may conclude that 
political cultures of Western Balkan countries do not allow us to draw a rosy 
picture in terms of democratization  in these countries. However, the example 
of Macedonia which seemed to have the least democratic political culture 
among these countries, suggest that democratization and the stability of 
democratic regime do not only depend on a country’s political culture but 
rather were affected by a number of more easily changeable factors such as 
the pacts between elites and international intervention.   
Macedonia with its multiethnic societal structure has been unique in avoiding 
major conflict. Since the Ohrid agreement in 2001 it also achieved 
considerable success in building a multiethnic democracy (partly free 
according to Freedom House ratings (Matovski, 2008). The relative success of 
Macedonia was not predetermined. After its independence from the SFRY in 
1992, the republic of Macedonia faced severe domestic and international 
problems. There has not been a consensus among the political elites of the 
county. Macedonian majority and the Albanian and other minorities lived an 
uneasy life without much national identity. Politics was mired with mistrust 
between different ethnic groups. Economic and social problems of the 
country were not  less serious (Perry, 2001). The European Union played an 
important role in easing the ethnic tension and encouraing the Slavic 
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Macedonian and Albanian leaders to sign the Ohrid Agreement in 2001 
(Cohen, 2005, 367).  Despite some progress on interenthnic relations, there 
remains signifcant problems between two communities. For example, Cohen 
quotes an Albanian leader as stating that ‘Neither Albanians nor the 
Macedonians are loyal to the state’ (Cohen, 2005, 371).  Without 
international intervention, these tensions could easily turn into violence and 
separation. Therefore, it can be argued that despite its shortcomings and the 
difficulties it may encounter (Hoffman, 2005, Pridham, 2008), the European 
Union policies have had  considerable impact on the process of 
democratization in Western Balkan countries and particularly in Macedonia. 
Therefore, we need to look at other explanations such as the impact of 
international environment and the role of elites in explaining the relative 
success of Macedonia. 
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